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1. Introduction
Corporate governance (gongsi zhili) is a concept whose time seems definitely to have
come in China. Chinese definitions of corporate governance in the abstract tend to cover
the system regulating relationships among all parties with interests in a business
organization, usually spelling out shareholders as a particularly important group (e.g.,
Liu, 1999; Yin, 1999). But Chinese corporate governance discourse in practice focuses
almost exclusively on agency problems and within only two types of firms: state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), particularly after their transformation into one of the corporate forms
provided for under the Company Law,1 and listed companies, which must be companies
limited by shares (CLS) under the Company Law. This article discusses Chinese corporate
governance in this narrow sense and attempts to explain some perplexing features of its
discourse, laws, and institutions (abbreviated hereinafter as ‘‘corporate governance laws
and institutions’’ or CGLI).
A fundamental dilemma of Chinese CGLI stems from the state policy of maintaining a
full or controlling ownership interest in enterprises in several sectors. The state wants the
enterprises it owns to be run efficiently, but not solely for the purpose of wealth
maximization. If the state owned simply for the purpose of maximizing the economic
value of its holdings, there would be no need for a policy mandating state ownership of
enterprises. If the enterprise would be worth more managed by another,2 the state should
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2 This will often be so. Chinese firms without dominant state ownership have been shown in several studies
to outperform firms with dominant state ownership (Chen, 2001; Qi, Wu, & Zhang, 2000; Xu & Wang, 1999).
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seek a share of that increased value by selling. A policy of wealth maximization for the
state requires simply that the state acquire, maintain, or relinquish control according to
whatever will realize the most wealth for the state.
Because the Chinese government clearly does not have such a policy, it follows that a
necessary element of state control of an enterprise must be the use of that control for
purposes other than the maximization of its wealth as a shareholder–purposes such as the
maintenance of urban employment levels, direct control over sensitive industries, or
politically motivated job placement.3
This in turn creates several problems. First, many of these goals are not easily measured
and there is no obvious way of balancing them one against the other. This creates
monitoring difficulties. Second, the policy of continued state involvement sets up a
conflict of interest between the state as controlling shareholder and other shareholders. In
using its control for purposes other than value maximization, the state exploits minority
shareholders who have no other way to benefit from their investment.
The major theme of this article is that the state wants to make SOEs operate more
efficiently by subjecting them to a new and different set of rules—the rules of organization
under the ‘‘modern enterprise system.’’ This is what the policy of corporatization is chiefly
about. Policymakers then find, however, that they must change and adjust the rules to take
account of continuing state ownership. Moreover, the need to provide for the special
circumstances of state sector enterprises ends up hijacking the entire Company Law so that
instead of state sector enterprises being made more efficient by being forced to follow the
rules for private sector enterprises (the original ambition), potential private sector enter-
prises are hamstrung by having to follow rules that make sense only in a heavily state-
invested economy.
Finally, corporate governance is about more than simply getting the rules right. The
necessary supporting institutions must be present as well. Yet as I will argue, their
existence in China cannot always be taken for granted.
2. Background to Chinese CGLI reform
Chinese CGLI reform, and the Company Law that is a part of it, is designed primarily to
address problems within the state sector, in particular the problem of the reform of
traditional state-owned enterprises (TSOEs) (Jiang, 2000, p. 21; Wang, 1999, p. 135).
The need of nonstate actors for a convenient form in which to conduct business occupies a
3 Thus, we should understand as internally contradictory various proposals for the state to retain ownership
of certain enterprises but to run them entirely on profit-oriented lines. Tenev and Zhang (2002, p. 133) go even
further by suggesting that the state’s current equity stake be replaced by an interest akin to nonvoting preferred
stock. The problem of continuing state ownership of enterprises cannot be finessed so easily. Nonvoting preferred
stock might be a good investment in the right circumstances, but it is hard to see why a policymaker who believes
that state ownership ought to mean something would be satisfied with it or why the state should commit itself
never to sell it. Indeed, in replacing its equity stake with nonvoting preferred stock, the state would be giving up
its ability to use control not just to pursue noneconomic goals, but also to defend itself from exploitation by
management or controlling shareholders or even to exploit other shareholders for its own economic benefit.
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very low priority in the minds of state policymakers, and the Company Law is thus clearly
concerned more with regulating and suppressing than with fostering and nurturing. Indeed,
it would be anomalous were it otherwise. There is a deep-rooted official suspicion of
accumulations of wealth not controlled by the state or its officials (Fang, 2000; Kirby,
1995), coupled with the suspicion of any organized activity not firmly under state
leadership (Saich, 2000). A government that bans unauthorized fishing clubs and associ-
ations for the study of antique furniture and paper cutting (MOCA, 2003) is unlikely to
welcome the unbridled blossoming of organizations whose purpose is to make real money.
The TSOE is not simply another name for a corporation such as Air France that
happens to be wholly owned by the state. Instead, it can be analogized for economic
purposes to a cost center or a division within the loosely organized firm of ‘‘China, Inc.’’.
There was no formal law governing industrial TSOEs until 1988, and there is still no
formal law governing commercial TSOEs. There was never any need. The things that an
organizational statute does—for example, the regulation of relations among creditors,
investors, and managers—were simply handled through internal state administrative
procedures since all three were state bodies or state employees.
For the purposes of this article, it is essential to distinguish TSOEs as defined here—
SOEs as they existed under the planned economy—from enterprises organized under the
Company Law that happen to be wholly state owned or controlled by the state, even
though such enterprises are commonly called ‘‘state owned.’’ A crucial element of
thinking about enterprise law and the Company Law in particular is that there are
important differences between the two ways of structuring SOEs.
Current policy respecting TSOEs is essentially to abolish the form by corporatizing
them, i.e., converting them into some form of company governed by the Company Law:
(a) a CLS, the approximate equivalent of the large stock corporation in Western countries,
(b) a limited liability company (LLC),4 intended for a much smaller and more closely knit
group of investors, or (c) a wholly state-owned limited liability company (WSOLLC), a
special type of LLC that may be wholly owned by a state agency. This process, which does
not necessarily involve privatization—it all depends on who owns the shares in the
converted company—is already well under way.
The corporatization policy has many purposes. They include the raising of equity
capital for SOEs following conversion to the corporate form, the expansion of state control
in some sectors through leverage, and the improvement of the management of state assets
through the implementation of a new organizational form. A secondary consideration in
passing the Company Law was also the promotion of growth in the nonstate sector via the
provision of a new organizational form. Some of these purposes are discussed below in
more detail.
A final point to note about CGLI reforms is that despite talk of the state withdrawing
from the economy, it is firmly committed to retaining control over enterprises in several
sectors: national security-related industries, natural monopolies, sectors providing impor-
tant goods and services to the public, and important enterprises in pillar industries and the
4 While all organizations under the Company Law are ‘‘limited liability companies’’ in the sense that their
shareholders are not normally responsible for their debts, I refer here to one specific organizational form that goes
by this specific name (youxian zeren gongsi).
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high-technology sector (JJRB, 2003). Indeed, part of enterprise reform involves a
magnification of the scope of direct state control through leverage (CCP, 1999; Ma,
Mok, & Cheung, 2001). In the traditional economic system, the state (through one or more
of its agencies) was the sole owner of a TSOE and exercised full control over it.
Corporatization, through the institution of divisible equity shares, allows nonstate invest-
ors to contribute to the enterprise without while they remain in a minority sharing in
control. The state maintains the same level of control it had before, but now over a larger
pool of assets.5
3. Purposes of corporatization: improved management through restructuring
While corporatization has many purposes, the chief one is the promotion of higher
efficiency through better management. Corporatization is intended to address through
structural reform three features of the traditional system of state ownership that are blamed
for the inefficiency of that sector. First, commentators criticize the supposed unity of
ownership and control in the hands of the state under the old system, with the resultant
imposition of non-profit-maximizing objectives on enterprise managers through ‘‘bureau-
cratic interference.’’ Second, they point to the problem of conflicting objectives from
multiple state agencies with authority over the enterprise. Third, they point to the absence
of an effective ultimate principal with an interest in, and ability to, police managers and
ensure efficient operations. I discuss these in order below.
3.1. Ownership and control and ‘‘bureaucratic interference’’ in the traditional system
It is often said that the corporate form, through its separation of ownership (in the hands
of shareholders) from control (in the hands of management), will be a cure for the ills of
the TSOE, which are diagnosed as stemming from the unity of ownership and control (in
the hands of the state). Commentators paint a picture of harried managers trying to run a
business subject to constant bureaucratic interference from the government agency in
charge of the enterprise and told to meet various and conflicting goals. Corporatization is
supposed to separate state ownership from state control and thereby free managers from
such interference so that they can pursue efficient and profitable operations.
But both the diagnosis and the solution are fundamentally flawed. The solution is
flawed because it assumes that the goal of the state owner in the new system is profits. The
policy of corporatization does not involve a renunciation by the state of its ambition to
remain the direct owner of enterprises in a number of sectors, and this ambition makes no
sense if profits are the only objective.
The diagnosis is flawed because in the old system, ownership and control were just as
separate as they are in the new because the state is an abstract collectivity and not a person.
Although perhaps it could meaningfully be said to own, it must necessarily operate
5 As a former senior policymaker recently boasted, with an equity stake of a mere 6%, the state controls the
94% of ‘‘social capital’’ in the Guangzhou Light Industrial Group, and the enterprise is classified as ‘‘state
controlled’’ (Zhang & Xu, 2003).
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through human agents. SOEs were thus always controlled, both at the enterprise level and
at the level of the administrative body in charge of them, by human beings who did not
own the enterprise. Devolving more power to enterprise managers or corporatizing TSOEs
does not change this in the slightest.
Since the unity of ownership and control was never the problem, it follows that the
separation of ownership from control cannot be the solution. Yet much Chinese
commentary continues to view the separation of ownership from control not as a
regrettable concomitant of the division of labor between suppliers and managers of capital
(Berle & Means, 1968), but as a positive good to be pursued for its own sake because it
appears to be a necessary feature of the ‘‘modern enterprise system.’’ Far from fearing the
Berle and Means model of the corporation, in which shareholders are widely dispersed and
unable to exercise any meaningful control, reform-minded commentators have seemed to
welcome it. Indeed, concentrated shareholding is viewed by many as almost a perversion
of the ideal of widely dispersed shareholding.6
Yet calls for government-owned enterprises to be independent of government ‘‘inter-
ference’’ are calls for nothing short of utter nonaccountability for management. Given that
the assets were contributed to the enterprise by a government agency—certainly not by the
managers—it seems reasonable for the agency to have some say in how the assets are
used. The issue, of course, is what kind of targets the agency sets for the managers and
how it evaluates their performance. But that is a reason to propose changes in how the state
manages its agents, not to cease managing them entirely.
3.2. Multiple objectives
The problem of multiple objectives is certainly a real one. As a complex organization of
human beings organized into various subgroups, all with their own objectives, the state
does not, and arguably cannot, produce a single consistent set of targets for its agents to
maximize. Moreover, control over SOEs in the traditional system was often divided among
multiple agencies—one or more for labor, management, production targets, inputs, etc.—
none of which had to internalize the costs of the decisions of the other. Thus, it was
difficult for anyone, had they been so inclined, to make and enforce a trade-off among
competing objectives.
Even where there is a single monitoring body, that body may itself have several
objectives. While profit maximization is a relatively straightforward index against which
to measure the performance of managers, noneconomic goals such as the preservation of
an industry for national security purposes are much more difficult to measure and hence to
monitor for. The monitoring agency may not even know itself how the costs and benefits
of achieving different state objectives should be measured and traded off against each
other and thus can hardly be an effective monitor of managers charged with achieving
those objectives.
Corporatization is explicitly intended to solve the problem of multiple controllers with
multiple objectives. First, the interests of the various state agencies involved in the
6 See, for example, Gu (2000), who proposes to limit the voting power of large shareholders, believing
(incorrectly) that this is a feature of American corporate law.
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enterprises are reduced to a common denominator—equity—and quantified. Second, the
new shareholders have only a single way in which to voice their interests—shareholder
voting—in which the majority rules, thus eliminating conflicting goals. Third, despite their
conflicting interests, the new shareholders now also have a common interest: distributable
profits. Thus, diversification of the shareholder base, even where share ownership is not
private, is intended to result in a stronger focus on the single target of profitability.
The theory has much to commend it. In practice, however, a large number of
corporatized SOEs remain dominated by a single state shareholder that exercises its
control either through formal channels, such as shareholder voting, or through traditional
channels, such as the acknowledged authority of the Communist Party’s organizational
department over personnel appointments in key state-owned and state-controlled enter-
prises, whether or not corporatized and listed on the stock market.
3.3. Absence of effective ultimate principal
Many analysts of the monitoring problem in the state sector point to the absence of an
ultimate principal as a key problem. According to this analysis, an agent of the state
monitors the enterprise managers and another agent must monitor the monitor; however,
no matter how far up the chain of monitors we go, we never run into an ultimate
principal—or to be more accurate, the ultimate theoretical principal in the case of state
ownership, the citizenry of China, is far too dispersed and powerless to play any real role.
As a result, effective monitoring cannot take place because there is nobody in the chain of
monitors with the appropriate incentives; nobody who is entitled to the increase in asset
value that effective monitoring would bring about.7
Corporatization is intended to replace a pliant and negligent state owner with profit-
seeking shareholders that will monitor management more effectively. But was state
ownership per se ever the problem? Certainly the current structure can be blamed for
many problems. Even if the state as principal had mutually consistent and easily measurable
goals, its agents—the monitors of the enterprise managers—might not monitor well for
those goals. Actual supervision and monitoring is carried out by local officials who are
appointed and salaried by local government. Even if those officials perfectly represented the
interests of their principal, local government’s interests can often conflict with those of the
center. And in practice, of course, the effectiveness of local officials’ monitoring is
compromised both by their incentives to shirk and in many cases by their simple lack of
skills to understand which actions would increase or decrease enterprise value.
Yet while the lack of an ultimate human owner can be a source of considerable agency
costs, these costs need not be crippling. There are many successfully functioning
institutions, such as nonprofit organizations (Hansmann, 1996) or industrial foundations
(Thomsen, 1999), that lack an ultimate human owner at the top of a chain of monitors
capable of claiming residual earnings, and there are even more—for example, govern-
ments and pension funds—that function with an ultimate human ‘‘owner’’ so distant as to
be absent for all practical purposes.
7 For a general discussion of these issues, see Lin (2001), Liu (1999), Qi et al. (2000), Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), and Yu (2001).
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Thus, although the absence of an ultimate owner—i.e., a human being with both control
over the agent below him or her and a right to the residual—is an obstacle to efficient
monitoring, it is not an insuperable one or the greatest one. It is hard, therefore, to see why
state employees should be inherently incapable of monitoring effectively, given the right
targets, skills, and incentives. The problem with state monitoring is far more likely to be
found in the lack of these elements, not in the lack of an ultimate human principal.
Whatever the importance of a human monitor at the top of the chain, corporatization as
currently practiced will not bring it about. When TSOEs are corporatized and share
interests allocated or sold, the new shareholders are, for the most part, either state agencies
or other entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, by the state. This is true whether or
not such companies are listed on China’s stock markets. Such entities may well be
structured with the intention that they be profit seeking, but if they are in fact able to
pursue profits effectively, that would only show that private ownership was not necessary
in the first place. No amount of restructuring can eliminate the cost of the absent principal
if state ownership is retained, since the latter necessarily entails the former.
4. Continued presence of state considerations in CGLI
Despite the reformist ambition animating the corporatization project, state sector
considerations remain strong. As the owner of state sector firms, the state may reasonably
stipulate how they should be run. But it is not necessary to stipulate at the same time the
fine details of how nonstate parties should associate. This section will highlight two
sample areas in which state sector considerations have worked backwards to shape the
Company Law in ways unsuited to nonstate enterprises, in one case through prescribing
unnecessary or undesirable rules and in the other through failing to do so.
4.1. Preference for mandatory over default rules
One goal of the corporatization project and the Company Law was to make it easier to
organize for economic activity. Whether this goal has been achieved is questionable. Take,
for example, the basic policy decision of whether to make the applicable rules mandatory
or to allow company organizers a degree of latitude to choose the governance rules they
feel are most appropriate for their circumstances. The policy choice in the current
Company Law is clear: the rules are almost uniformly mandatory. As the corporate law
scholar Fang (2000, p. 40) complained, ‘‘The whole Company Law is pervaded with the
attitude of ‘making decisions on behalf of the people.’ The legislator shows an excessive
self-confidence. It believes it is more intelligent than the parties and can make arrange-
ments in their stead.’’
Why should participants in a business not be left to work out their own deal? Part of the
answer may lie in the traditional mistrust of China’s ruling elites for private solutions and
an almost instinctive preference for uniformity over diversity, even if it carries no
particular benefits. But much of the answer lies, once again, in the Company Law’s
overwhelming orientation toward the corporatization of TSOEs. The paradigmatic
enterprise—or at least, the paradigmatic CLS—contemplated by the Company Law is
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not one formed by a group of private entrepreneurs who are attempting to contract among
themselves for the optimal set of governance rules. It is the corporatizing TSOE. Thus, it is
not surprising that the rules do not leave choices up to contracting parties; there are no
contracting parties, realistically speaking, when a TSOE is transformed. TSOE transfor-
mation into a CLS is a process that takes place under governmental direction. The contours
of the deal that ultimately governs the relations of the initial shareholders are not strongly
shaped by market forces: there is no market for corporate control, no market for managers,
and no ‘‘Wall Street option’’ for the state investor. Thus, it may be that there is no good
reason for thinking that leaving the governance rules to ‘‘the parties’’ in this particular case
will have economically efficient results. Indeed, it is conceivable in principle that however
rigid and inappropriate some of the rules of the Company Law may be, they are better and
less wasteful of state assets than the structure that state officials and incumbent TSOE
managers might put together on their own if unconstrained by such rules.
At the same time, however, it is hard to see why, when state assets are not involved,
decisions on a number of matters could not be left up to the parties involved. The state
may wish to impose on its own enterprises, for example, rules about the reinvestment of
profits8 or the minimum and maximum number of directors,9 but why should private
parties be subject to the same rules?
That legislators are capable of leaving a great deal to participants in some business
enterprises is clear from the great, even excessive, latitude shown on questions of
enterprise organization where the transformation of large TSOEs is not involved. The
Partnership Law, the Village and Township Enterprise Law, and the regulations on stock
cooperative enterprises (SCRES, 1997) are all much shorter than the Company Law and
prescribe a great deal less. Indeed, there is at least one officially acknowledged form of
business enterprise—a wholly owned subsidiary established by a parent enterprise—with
separate legal personality that has no laws or regulations whatsoever governing its
internal structure. Its legislative sanction, if it exists at all, does not extend beyond a
single cryptic sentence in the Company Law providing that companies may establish
subsidiaries.10
Where the transformation of TSOEs is involved, however, legislators not unreasonably
want to have rules about the end result. This is what having a state policy means. The
problem is that while it might make sense for many mandatory rules to be limited only to
state-owned and state-controlled companies, such a limitation would require the resurrec-
tion of a distinction between state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies, a
distinction that it was a major purpose of the corporatization policy to erase. Once again,
we see that because of the policy of transforming the organizational form of TSOEs into
companies, the needs and imperatives of the state sector have hijacked the rules and
structure of the Company Law. Instead of the intended effect—that classical company law
principles should govern SOEs in order to make them efficient—the opposite has been
achieved: the entire corporate sector has come to be governed, in significant degree, by
principles that are needed and applicable, if at all, only to the state sector.
8 Company Law, Art. 177.
9 Company Law, Art. 112.
10 Company Law, Art. 13.
D.C. Clarke / China Economic Review 14 (2003) 494–507 501
4.2. Inability to establish uniform legal standard for officers and directors
Because the state’s policy is not to maximize shareholder wealth, it is difficult to create
appropriate uniform standards to which to hold managers and controlling shareholders. If
controlling shareholders seek to maximize the value of their shares, the interests of
minority shareholders will automatically be served. But if the state uses its control for
purposes other than value maximization, it exploits minority shareholders who have no
other way to benefit from their investment.
As long as state policy requires the state to remain an active investor in firms of which
it is not the sole shareholder, meaningful legal protection for minority shareholders is
going to mean either constraints on the state’s ability to do precisely those things for which
it retained control or else a de facto separate legal regime (at least as far as minority
shareholder rights are concerned) for enterprises in which the state is the dominant
shareholder. But a separate legal regime will require the maintenance of a strict boundary
between state-controlled companies on the one hand and other companies on the other, a
boundary that it was precisely the ambition of TSOE corporatization to erase.11
The failure to face this question squarely makes it extremely difficult to formulate legal
rules on the duties of management. Although the Company Law imposes a duty of loyalty
(zhongshi yiwu),12 there appears to be no means of enforcing this duty, and no duty of care
is spelled out. Moreover, although maximization of shareholder wealth is quite frequently
stated by commentators to be the proper duty of managers and controlling shareholders in
non-state-controlled companies, nowhere in the entire corpus of laws and regulations on
corporate governance can such a duty actually be found.
5. Proposals for reform: power of controlling shareholders
Probably the most common complaint about the current Company Law is that it gives
too much power to controlling shareholders. As discussed above, much Chinese com-
mentary idealizes the Berle and Means (1968) model of dispersed ownership and pictures
the corporation almost as a kind of political community whose members debate policy at
shareholder meetings and vote after serious consideration of the issues. Where a
controlling shareholder unilaterally calls the shots, shareholder meetings are reduced to
a formality, and commentators view this as a perversion of the ideal. Thus, many
commentators view the presence of the dominant single shareholder (yigu duda) as a
problem, and proposals to reign in their power are not just about attacking their ability to
11 The result in practice may simply be no meaningful protection for minority shareholders. Consider the
remarks of the Dean of the Changjiang School of Business, who serves as an independent director:
I have never thought that the independent director is the protector of medium and small shareholders; never
think that. My job is first and foremost to protect the interests of the large shareholder, because the large
shareholder is the state (GAXXRB, 2003).
12 Company Law, Articles 59–62.
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exploit minority shareholders, but about attacking the very idea of stable control over a
corporation as such.
The first problem with this picture of corporate organization is that it is profoundly
unrealistic. A corporation is not a political community and cannot be expected to function
like one. Corporate law considers it entirely right and proper that those with more money
should have a bigger voice, and it is uneconomical for minority shareholders to spend time
educating themselves on corporate issues and physically attending shareholder meetings
when their vote will not affect the outcome.13
The second problem is that an ideal, however unrealistic, that is thought suitable for
companies on the basis of a private ownership model simply cannot be realized in a
world of extensive state ownership. The biggest dominant shareholder in China is the
Chinese state. An attack on dominant share ownership per se is an attack on state
ownership and cannot be expected to move beyond academic journals into legislative
reality.
The third problem with this picture is that it is far from clear that concentrated
ownership by itself is a bad thing anyway. Some recent studies of Chinese listed
companies have found that in general, corporate performance seems to be positively
correlated with concentrated ownership by institutional shareholders other than state
agencies and negatively associated with dispersed ownership (Chen, 2001; Qi et al., 2000;
Xu & Wang, 1999).14 Thus, legal policy should be directed at eliminating abuses, not
eliminating concentrated ownership as such.
6. Institutions of corporate governance
Any system of corporate governance depends on a set of institutions for its imple-
mentation. In the United States, for example, corporate governance of public companies
depends not only on the existence of markets for equity, debt, managerial talent, and
corporate control, but also on intermediate institutions (such as the financial press and the
legal and accounting services industries) and legal institutions such as courts, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and private litigants. We may debate whether these
institutions can play the roles assigned to them (compare, for example, Coffee, 2002, with
Ribstein, 2002), but we have a pretty good idea of what they are.
It is similarly critical to any scheme of corporate governance in China that it be
informed by a realistic view of the available institutions and their ability to perform the
expected task. Too much cannot, for example, be expected of private plaintiff-driven
litigation in the courts. Listed companies got that way because they and their officers had
political backing; Chinese courts are not politically powerful and are hence reluctant to
take cases involving large sums of money and powerful defendants. The Supreme People’s
Court allows courts to hear only a very limited class of securities-related claims (Supreme
13 On collective action problems generally, see Olson (1971).
14 Research on United States firms (e.g., McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Wruck, 1989) has found that the
relationship between firm performance and ownership concentration is an inverted V: as concentration rises,
performance rises at first, but then declines as concentration rises still further.
D.C. Clarke / China Economic Review 14 (2003) 494–507 503
People’s Court, 2003). Thus, if corporate governance reform is understood to mean
inserting appropriate private rights of action into the Company Law, it is unlikely to lead
anywhere very soon.
What about government agencies? The prime candidate here would seem to be the
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC); however, it is hampered by signif-
icant disabilities. First, its staff is small relative to the scale of its tasks.15 Consider the
respective tasks of the CSRC and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
solely in the field of listed company oversight. The main task of the SEC is the
enforcement of rules regarding disclosure. It is not expected to be a guarantor of
corporate profits. The CSRC, on the other hand, must enforce merit requirements that
attempt to ensure the investment quality of the business as well as disclosure require-
ments. Moreover, its very authority to make and enforce rules regarding corporate
governance has been challenged as insufficiently grounded in legislation (Sheng, 2001;
Tang, 2001). So far, the challenge has been only academic, but at some point a suitably
motivated court might agree.
The need to consider the role of institutions can be demonstrated by looking at the
CSRC’s recent regulations requiring listed companies to have at least one third of their
board consist of independent directors by June 30, 2003 (CSRC, 2001). The independent
directors are said to owe a duty of good faith (chengxin) and diligence (qinmian) to the
company and to the entire body of shareholders. But can this duty be made meaningful in
China’s current legal system?
The Company Law speaks only of a duty of loyalty (zhongshi), and it is far from clear
that shareholders could successfully sue for a breach. It is very unlikely that the CSRC,
which does not even have the status of a regular government administrative agency, can by
itself create a private right of action for shareholders against directors. It has engaged in a
limited number of disciplinary actions against directors,16 but any norm that relies solely
on administrative enforcement is going to be of limited value, given the CSRC’s resource
constraints.
As Roe (2002) has pointed out, corporate governance depends on much more than
simply getting the law right. The presence of other institutions is critical. But their
presence in China cannot be assumed. The financial information industry, for example,
is significantly crippled by the state’s continuing insistence on control over all
information. Control over information is a cornerstone of the Chinese Communist
Party’s system of political control and is unlikely to disappear much before the Party
itself. Other intermediary institutions such as law firms, accounting firms, investment
banks, brokerages, and stock exchanges all exist—like any organization in China—only
with government permission and cannot simply spring up in response to market demand.
There is no real market for corporate control, and the market for managerial talent is still
very small.
15 Professional staff probably number well under 1500 nationwide (CSRC official, July 2003, personal
communication).
16 See, for example, the tale of the hapless Lu Jiahao, an academic who despite no experience in business was
asked to serve as an independent director, did so without compensation, and ended up being fined 100,000 yuan
by the CSRC for his troubles (Wei, 2002; Wu, 2002).
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7. Conclusion
Any discussion of corporate governance in China must take seriously the implications
of the state’s policy of continuing and significant involvement in enterprise ownership.
Many of the problems the drafters of the Company Law sought to address are not
necessarily best addressed by a statute like the Company Law or even by an institution
such as legislation and government enforcement. Where they are state sector issues, it
might seem almost perverse to attempt to address them through an institution designed to
operate in a universe of freedom of contract and private rights. While the policy of state
ownership continues, the only way to clear the road for the development of a corporate
governance system appropriate for non-SOEs is for policymakers to acknowledge that a
unified model is neither necessary nor desirable.
But getting the model right is not enough. Policymakers must also think clearly about
the capacity of the institutions—not just legal, but social and economic—that are needed
to make the model function as expected.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to express his thanks to Michael Dowdle and Barry Naughton for
their thoughtful and very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, as well as to
the Fulbright Program for its support of the research on which this article is based.
References
Berle, A., & Means, G. (1968). The modern corporation and private property. New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World (Rev. ed.).
CCP (Chinese Communist Party). (1999, September 22). Guanyu guoyou qiye gaige he fazhan ruogan zhongda
wenti de jueding (Decision on several important questions in the reform and development of state-owned
enterprises). Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.
Chen, J. (2001). Ownership structure as corporate governance mechanism: Evidence from Chinese listed com-
panies. Economics of Planning, 34, 53–71.
Coffee, J. (2002). Understanding Enron: It’s about the gatekeepers, stupid (Working Paper No. 207). Columbia
Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies.
CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission). (2001, August 16). Guanyu zai shangshi gongsi jianli duli
dongshi zhidu de zhidao yijian (Guidance opinion on the establishment of an independent director system in
listed companies).
Fang, L. (2000). Wen gu zhi xin—tan Gongsi Fa xiugai (Reviewing the old to understand the new: A discussion
of reform of the Company Law). In F. Guo, & J. Wang (Eds.), Gongsi Fa xiugai zongheng tan (An all-around
discussion of reform of the Company Law) (pp. 35–42). Beijing: Falu¨ Chubanshe.
GAXXRB (2003, January 1). Duli dongshi xiang huaping? (Are independent directors just decorative?). Gang-
Ao Xinxi Ribao (Hong Kong-Macao News Daily).
Gu, G. (2000). Gongsi Fa xiugai ying jiejue de ruogan shiji wenti (Several practical problems that should be
solved in a revision of the Company Law). In F. Guo, & J. Wang (Eds.), Gongsi Fa xiugai zongheng tan (An
all-around discussion of reform of the Company Law) (pp. 57–61). Beijing: Falu¨ Chubanshe.
Hansmann, H. (1996). The ownership of enterprise. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Jiang, P. (2000). Gongsi fa cong 19 shiji dao 20 shiji de fazhan (The development of company law from the 19th
century to the 20th century). In F. Guo, & J. Wang (Eds.), Gongsi Fa xiugai zongheng tan (An all-around
discussion of reform of the Company Law) (pp. 21–28). Beijing: Falu¨ Chubanshe.
D.C. Clarke / China Economic Review 14 (2003) 494–507 505
JJRB (2003, June 13). Heli buju tiaozheng jiegou, fazhan zhuangda guoyou jingji—fang Guowuyuan Guoyou
Zichan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui zhuren Li Rongrong (Rationally lay out structural adjustment, develop a
great state-owned economy: A visit with the Chairman of the State Council’s State Asset Supervision and
Management Commission, Li Rongrong). Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily).
Kirby, W. (1995). China unincorporated: Company Law and business enterprise in twentieth century China.
Journal of Asian Studies, 54, 43–63.
Lin, C. (2001). Corporatisation and corporate governance in China’s economic transition. Economics of Plan-
ning, 34, 5–35.
Liu, Y. (1999). Cong xiandai qiye lilun yu chanquan lilun kan Zhongguo de gongsi zhili wenti (Looking at
Chinese corporate governance issues from the standpoint of the theory of the modern firm and the theory
of property rights). In Zhongguo (Hainan) Gaige Fazhan Yanjiu Yuan [China (Hainan) Reform and
Development Institute] (Ed.), Zhongguo gongsi zhili jiegou (The structure of corporate governance in
China) (pp. 119–132). Beijing: Waiwen Chubanshe.
Ma, N., Mok, K. H., & Cheung, A. (2001). Advance and retreat: The new two-pronged strategy of enterprise
reform in China. Problems of Post-Communism, 48, 52–61.
McConnell, J., & Servaes, H. (1990). Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of
Financial Economics, 27, 595–612.
MOCA (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Civil Affairs). (2003, June 6). Gonggao (Bulletin) No. 41.
Available: http://www.mca.gov.cn/news/shtuan41.html (Last visited June 28, 2003).
Olson, M. (1971). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Qi, D., Wu, W., & Zhang, H. (2000). Shareholding structure and corporate performance of partially privatized
firms: Evidence from listed Chinese companies. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 8, 587–610.
Ribstein, L. (2002). Market vs. regulatory responses to corporate fraud: A critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002. Journal of Corporation Law, 28, 1–67.
Roe, M. (2002). Corporate law’s limits. Journal of Legal Studies, 31, 233–271.
Saich, A. (2000, March). Negotiating the state: The development of social organizations in China. China
Quarterly, (161), 124–141.
SCRES (State Commission on Reform of the Economic System). (1997, August 7). Guanyu fazhan chengshi
gufen hezuozhi qiye de zhidao yijian (Guidance opinion on the development of urban stock cooperative
enterprises).
Sheng, X. (2001). Woguo zhengquan jianguan falu¨ zhidu moshi (The model for China’s securities regulatory
legal system). Xiandai Faxue (Modern Law Science), No. 3, 116–120.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52, 737–783.
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China. (2003, January 9). Guanyu shenli zhengquan
shichang yin xujia chenshu yinfa de minshi peichang anjian de ruogan guiding (Several provisions on the
adjudication of civil suits for damages arising out of false representations in securities markets).
Tang, X. (2001, November 18). Zhongguo shangshi gongsi zhili huanjing de xin fazhan (New developments in
the corporate governance environment for Chinese listed companies). Paper presented at 21st Century Com-
mercial Law Forum, Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, China.
Tenev, S., & Zhang, C. (2002). Corporate governance and enterprise reform in China. Washington, DC: World
Bank and the International Finance Corporation.
Thomsen, S. (1999). Corporate ownership by industrial foundations. European Journal of Law and Economics, 7
(2), 117–136.
Wang, B. (1999). Gufen youxian gongsi zuzhi jigou de fa de shitai kaocha yu lifa keti (A study of the current
legal situation of the organizational structure of companies limited by shares and the legislative program for
them). In Zhongguo (Hainan) Gaige Fazhan Yanjiu Yuan [China (Hainan) Reform and Development Institute]
(Ed.) Zhongguo gongsi zhili jiegou (The structure of corporate governance in China) (pp. 134–150). Beijing:
Waiwen Chubanshe.
Wei, Y. (2002, December 13). Duli dongshi bei fa di yi an (The first case of an independent director being fined),
Zhongguo Lu¨shi Wang (Chinese Lawyer Net). Available: http://www.chineselawyer.com.cn/article/
200212135599.html.
Wruck, K. (1989). Equity ownership concentration and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics, 23, 3–28.
D.C. Clarke / China Economic Review 14 (2003) 494–507506
Wu, G. (2002, November 20). Cong Lu Jiahao an fansi duli dongshi zhidu (Reflections on the independent
director system from the Lu Jiahao case). Jiancha Ribao (Procuratorate Daily).
Xu, X., & Wang, Y. (1999). Ownership structure and corporate governance in Chinese stock companies. China
Economic Review, 10, 75–98.
Yin, W. (1999). Qiye jituan shangshi gongsi de guquan jiegou gaizao (Reform in the equity structure of listed
enterprise group companies). In Zhongguo (Hainan) Gaige Fazhan Yanjiu Yuan [China (Hainan) Reform and
Development Institute] (Ed.) Zhongguo gongsi zhili jiegou (The structure of corporate governance in China)
(pp. 98–111). Beijing: Waiwen Chubanshe.
Yu, Y. (2001, May/June). Da gudong kongzhixing gongsi zhili de xiaolu¨ pingjia (An assessment of the efficiency
of corporate governance with a dominant shareholder). Caijing Kexue (Financial Science), No. 3, 50–53.
Zhang, J., & Xu, S. (2003, July 14). 196 jia zhongyang qiye da zhenghe: Yanchu kaishi le (Big reorganization
of 196 central enterprises: The performance has begun). 21 Shiji Jingji Baodao (21st Century Economic
Report).
Legislation
Company Law: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi FA (Company Law of the People’s Republic of China).
Adopted December 29, 1993. Effective July 1, 1994.
Partnership Law: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hehuo Qiye Fa (Partnership Enterprise Law of the People’s
Republic of China). Adopted February 23, 1997. Effective August 1, 1997.
Village and Township Enterprise Law: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xiang-Zhen Qiye Fa (Village and Township
Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of China). Adopted October 29, 1996. Effective January 1, 1997.
D.C. Clarke / China Economic Review 14 (2003) 494–507 507
